Erickson has written an exceptionally interesting book which belongs to the growing body of literature seeking to find the common points of philosophic concern that exist between phenomenology and analytic philosophy--to "swim the Channel" as it is put. He thinks primarily in the analytic tradition, but, from a purely quantitative point of view, most of this study is devoted to the analysis of Heidegger's thought. The most frequent analytic references are to Wittgenstein. In the first chapter, he seeks to (...) find some linguistic basis for raising the question of the meaning of Being--and not just of 'Being' and he engages in a lengthy discussion of the possible kinds of participal [[sic]] uses 'Being' might have in Heidegger's celebrated "question of Being." In the second chapter, he argues strongly for the possibility of an extra-linguistic meaning, a possibility uniformly neglected by the analytic "monoscopic" tradition. In Chapter three, he finds a common basis for phenomenology and for the analytic tradition in the "transcendental turn" that contemporary philosophy has taken. He rightly points out that for both phenomenology and analysis it is in language that, as Heidegger says, "things first come into being and are." This is an extremely important observation and fundamental to any bridge-building of these two traditions. The last chapter discusses the fact that Dasein understands itself in terms of its world: self-reflection is mediated by things. Among other things he argues in favor of Heidegger's views on the "ready-to-hand."--The most serious objection one can raise against this book is its character as a book: it has no really apparent beginning, middle and end. It originated in four previously published articles and it is doubtful that Erickson has succeeded in welding them together into a unity. The four chapters considered separately however are insightful and suggestive.--J. D. C. (shrink)

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of (...) the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding. (shrink)

I propose to consider in this paper some points concerning the part played by reason in non-moral conduct. The place of reason in ethics is a separate issue with which I shall not be directly concerned.

Defining terms -- The real world -- The news -- Reading as vacation -- Uses of culture -- The postmodern smirk -- The corporate gallery -- Icons and idols -- Man as Romanian -- Dowsing and science -- Origin myths -- Diplomatic memoir -- A syndrome of simile and metaphor -- Three dreams, one trip -- My obituaries -- Salt water -- My coronation -- Representations -- The pornographic dream -- Against art fairs -- Rescuing the subject from the picture (...) -- Branding the arts -- The end of the affair -- A defense of virtuosity -- Mere esthetics. (shrink)